Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements? :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Are Spinozistic Ideas Cartesian Judgements? Abstract Some commentators of Spinoza maintain that Spinozistic ideas are judgements. I shall call this view the common interpretation, since it is popular to interpret Spinoza as reacting against Descartes’s theory of ideas and accordingly consider Spinozistic ideas not as Cartesian ideas, but as Cartesian judgements. The clearest difference between Descartes and Spinoza here is that whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza thought the opposite. The concept of activity plays accordingly an important role in interpreting Spinoza’s theory of ideas. According to the common interpretation Spinoza and Descartes use the concept of activity in the same way. And since Descartes thought that judgements are active, it is maintained that the Spinozistic, active ideas are like Cartesian judgements. I find that the considerations according to which the activity of Spinozistic ideas is seen in the light of Descartes’s distinction between action and passion are based on too superficial an interpretation of Spinoza. I argue that what Spinoza means by saying that ideas are active does not merely mean that they are active in a Cartesian sense. He has in mind something additional to the mere Cartesian activity. Whereas Spinoza wants to say that active ideas incorporate the property of truth or certainty, Descartes does not think in that way about judgements. Thus, the Spinozistic ideas can be called truth-expressing. Introduction Renà © Descartes brought the concept of idea into a central place in epistemology. Another famous rationalist—Benedictus de Spinoza—made use of the same term "idea", but had an entirely different view concerning the nature of ideas. Whereas Descartes thought that ideas are passive, Spinoza had the opposite view according to which ideas are active. In this paper I shall examine what Spinoza means by the activity of ideas. According to some commentators Spinozistic ideas should be seen as Cartesian judgements. I call this view the common interpretation and I shall argue that it does not capture the whole of Spinoza’s theory of active ideas. The activity of Spinozistic ideas is something more than merely the kind of activity found in Cartesian judgements. In the first part I will sketch Descartes’ conception of ideas as passive. In the second and third part I move on the outline Spinoza’s position and point out that there are passages which motivate the common interpretation. In the fourth part I will proceed to argue that the activity of Spinozistic ideas is not merely that of Cartesian judgements.